THE COST OF REVOLUTION: WHEN PROTEST DESTROYS THE VERY THINGS A GENERATION WANTS TO CHANGE
France’s unrest is the visible expression of a much larger transition: the collision of historical economic arrangements, geopolitical realignment, industrial pressure, public debt and institutions struggling to adapt. The warning extends far beyond Europe.
There is a familiar moment in the life of a nation when frustration becomes impossible to contain. The public has complained, elections have come and gone, politicians have made promises, and institutions have continued operating in ways that leave substantial portions of the population feeling excluded from the benefits of national progress. Eventually, people take their dissatisfaction into the streets. Sometimes they march peacefully. Sometimes they blockade roads, occupy buildings or confront the authorities. And sometimes demonstrations deteriorate into violence, looting and the destruction of property.
France provides an important case study in understanding what happens when public frustration intersects with economic uncertainty, political fragmentation and a changing international order. The recent 60 Minutes report, examining weeks of demonstrations and unrest, captures some of the visible consequences: damaged businesses, injured police officers, public property destroyed and communities struggling to recover. It also presents the grievances behind the demonstrations, from inadequate school facilities and the cost of living to inequality, employment opportunities and dissatisfaction with political leadership.
Those grievances deserve serious attention.
A government cannot expect public confidence to survive indefinitely when people believe essential institutions are failing them. But neither should the destruction accompanying political unrest be treated as an incidental detail. The more difficult question is what happens when the pursuit of a better society begins damaging the economic and institutional foundations upon which that society must depend.
To understand France, however, we have to look beyond the demonstrations. We have to examine the economic architecture beneath the country, the international relationships that helped shape its historical position, the pressures now challenging its economic model and the consequences of institutions that have struggled to respond to changing expectations.
This is not simply a story about protests. It is a story about a country confronting several transitions simultaneously.
THE GRIEVANCE IS REAL. SO IS THE BILL.
The 60 Minutes report illustrates how demonstrations that begin with specific grievances can expand into broader political movements. Students initially protesting deteriorating school conditions and inadequate facilities found their concerns amplified through social media. The movement spread, attracting people with different complaints about inequality, economic opportunity, immigration, political leadership and the direction of French society.
That expansion is important. A movement can begin with a relatively clear demand and eventually become a vehicle for a much wider collection of frustrations. Once that happens, it becomes more difficult to distinguish between the original objectives, the interests of different participating groups and the political agendas of those seeking to benefit from the unrest.
But the economic consequences are not abstract. A business is not simply a building with a commercial sign above its entrance. It is someone’s accumulated savings, years of personal sacrifice, employment for other people, relationships with suppliers, credit obligations and a source of income for an entire household. The bakery owner featured in the report describes losing years of work after her business was looted. That experience deserves more than a passing reference in a discussion about capitalism.
The independent bakery, neighbourhood grocery store and family-owned restaurant are not necessarily representatives of the billionaires or political interests being criticized. They may be businesses operated by people who have spent years trying to establish a degree of financial independence. When their premises are destroyed, the damage does not automatically redistribute wealth to the people demanding a more equitable economic system. It can simply eliminate another source of employment and commercial activity from a community that may already have too few.
The French Senate’s examination of the June and July 2023 riots provides a useful illustration of the scale of these consequences. Its inquiry recorded approximately €1 billion in property damage, including around €793 million in insured claims covering more than 16,000 reported incidents. More than 1,000 businesses were vandalized or looted, while thousands of buildings were burned or damaged. Public facilities, including schools and municipal buildings, were also affected. These figures demonstrate something frequently overlooked in political arguments: the cost of unrest does not disappear when the demonstrations end. It becomes a bill that must be settled by someone.
THE INSURANCE ILLUSION: WHO ACTUALLY PAYS?
There is a familiar argument that wealthy people can simply insure their assets and move on. There is some truth to the observation, but it is an incomplete understanding of how insurance and economic risk work. Insurance does not make destruction free. It transfers defined financial risks through a contractual system. The policyholder pays premiums, the insurer collects and pools those premiums, and claims are assessed against the coverage, exclusions, limits and deductibles contained in the policy. Where losses exceed an insurer’s retained exposure, reinsurance arrangements may distribute some of the risk further. The financial burden does not evaporate. It moves through a system of risk allocation.
A wealthy property owner may have the resources to absorb a deductible, retain legal assistance and finance repairs while waiting for an insurance settlement. A small business owner may not have the same financial resilience. Even where a policy covers physical damage, business interruption can be subject to separate conditions. A shop can receive compensation for damaged premises and still suffer lost customers, interrupted cash flow, unpaid obligations and the permanent loss of its commercial position.
Public infrastructure presents another complication. When a municipal building, school, transport facility or public road is damaged, the eventual cost can fall on public budgets. Taxpayers become part of the recovery process, whether or not they supported the protest.
This is where the argument becomes particularly difficult to ignore. A young person demanding better schools may participate in an event that damages public facilities, interrupts education or diverts municipal resources away from the very services being demanded. A community seeking better transport can find its buses destroyed. Residents asking for greater public investment can end up paying for the replacement of public property through taxes or reduced spending elsewhere.
The irony is not merely symbolic. It is fiscal. The financial consequences also extend beyond the initial repair bill. Businesses lose trading days, employees lose working hours, suppliers lose customers and municipalities must redirect money and personnel towards recovery. The total economic cost can therefore exceed the amount recorded in insurance claims.
The wealthy may have more capacity to absorb a loss, but the assumption that destruction principally hurts the wealthy ignores the employees, customers, taxpayers and smaller operators who depend on the assets being destroyed.
FRANCE’S HISTORICAL ECONOMIC ARCHITECTURE: THE COLONIAL LEGACY
To understand France’s present position, it is necessary to examine its historical economic relationships beyond Europe. France’s former colonial empire created commercial, financial, political and institutional networks that continued to influence relationships with several African countries after independence. Political independence did not automatically dismantle every economic arrangement established during the colonial period. Trade relationships, currency cooperation, military agreements, corporate interests and diplomatic networks continued to shape the relationship between France and parts of Africa.
The CFA franc system is one of the clearest examples of this historical continuity.
The monetary arrangement originated in 1945, following the creation of a currency framework for French territories during the colonial period. After independence, many countries retained monetary cooperation arrangements with France. The system eventually developed into two principal regional currency unions in West and Central Africa, alongside the Comorian franc arrangement.
These currencies have maintained fixed exchange-rate relationships with the euro, supported by a French Treasury guarantee of convertibility. The arrangements have provided monetary stability and protection against certain balance-of-payments shocks. They have also generated longstanding debate about monetary sovereignty, exchange-rate flexibility and the historical imbalance of influence between France and its African partners.
Both dimensions matter.
It would be inaccurate to describe the current arrangements as though France exercises precisely the same institutional control it exercised under the original colonial framework. In 2019, France and the West African Economic and Monetary Union agreed to significant reforms. The requirement for the West African central bank to deposit foreign-exchange reserves with the French Treasury ended, and French representatives withdrew from the ordinary governance bodies of the BCEAO. However, the fixed exchange-rate relationship with the euro and the French convertibility guarantee remained. The arrangements with Central African countries and the Comoros have not undergone the same reforms.
This distinction matters because the relationship is not one uniform system operating identically across every country. It has evolved, and its implications differ across the monetary unions. Nevertheless, the broader historical question remains: how much economic advantage did France derive from its established commercial networks, political relationships, access to resources and institutional influence across territories that became independent states?That question deserves serious examination. It requires looking at contracts, ownership, taxation, profit repatriation, trade flows, currency arrangements and the activities of French companies in sectors such as mining, energy, telecommunications and infrastructure. It also requires examining the benefits and costs experienced by the African countries themselves.
The argument should not be reduced to the claim that every former colony supplied France with artificially cheap resources or that the CFA franc automatically transferred African wealth to the French Treasury. Those conclusions require specific evidence.
The more substantive point is that France historically operated within an international economic network that provided established relationships and forms of access that are now being renegotiated, challenged or lost. The geopolitical environment that supported those relationships has changed considerably.
THE SAHEL: WHEN STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIPS CHANGE
Niger is an important part of this discussion. For decades, Niger was an important uranium supplier to France. France operates one of the world’s most nuclear-dependent electricity systems, and uranium is a critical input in its nuclear fuel cycle. The relationship with Niger formed part of a wider network of commercial and strategic relationships in the Sahel.
However, France did not obtain all its uranium from Niger, and Burkina Faso was not the principal source of French nuclear fuel. France has diversified its uranium procurement, with Kazakhstan, Niger, Canada, Namibia and Uzbekistan among the countries identified in its official energy assessments as important suppliers.
The loss of access to Niger is therefore strategically significant, but it does not mean that France’s nuclear electricity system depended on a single African country. The more consequential issue is the changing geopolitical position of France across the Sahel.
Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have experienced major political changes, including military coups and substantial shifts in their relationships with Paris. French forces have withdrawn from several countries in the region. Russia and other international actors have sought greater influence, while the governments concerned have pursued different security and diplomatic arrangements.
France’s historical regional position involved overlapping interests: military access, counterterrorism cooperation, intelligence relationships, diplomatic influence, commercial activity and access to important resource networks. When these relationships change, the consequences extend beyond one commodity or one military deployment. France must reconsider its diplomatic, security and commercial calculations. Companies must reassess their operating environments. Resource supply chains may need to be diversified. Relationships that once appeared durable may have to be renegotiated under entirely different conditions.
However, the other side of this development is equally important. African countries have legitimate reasons to challenge unequal arrangements and seek greater control over their resources. Sovereignty should not be treated as an inconvenience to the commercial interests of a former colonial power. At the same time, political independence does not automatically produce economic prosperity. A country can renegotiate its resource contracts and still struggle with inadequate infrastructure, corruption, insufficient technical capacity, weak institutions or dependence on foreign financing and expertise.
Replacing one external dependency with another is not necessarily economic independence. The real question is whether countries can convert greater political control into domestic industrial capacity, public revenue, employment, technology transfer and long-term prosperity. That is the distinction between possessing resources and capturing their value.
THE INDUSTRIAL QUESTION: WHAT DOES FRANCE ACTUALLY PRODUCE?
Another important dimension is the condition of France’s industrial economy.
The OECD’s 2026 Economic Survey identifies industrial competitiveness as a structural challenge. Manufacturing has lost economic weight in France over several decades, with the OECD noting that the country’s deindustrialization has been sharper than the average across its member economies.
Manufacturing represented approximately 11.2% of French value added at the end of 2025, according to the survey’s analysis, compared with a higher share across the OECD. The report also identifies weaknesses in export performance, productivity and the ability to convert research and innovation into wider economic competitiveness. This is not a story of France having no industrial capacity. France remains internationally competitive in aerospace, luxury goods, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, defence and other important sectors. It is a story of uneven competitiveness and the long-term consequences of a changing industrial structure.
Manufacturing is not simply about factories. It creates supplier networks, skilled employment, technical expertise, industrial research, export capacity and economic multipliers. When a country loses manufacturing capability, it can become more dependent on imported products and foreign industrial ecosystems. The implications are significant. Domestic suppliers may lose scale and investment opportunities. Industrial employment can become more difficult to sustain. Technical capabilities and industrial knowledge can migrate elsewhere. The country becomes more exposed to disruptions in international supply chains.
The automobile industry illustrates the pressure particularly well. European manufacturers face competition from Chinese producers, the transition to electric vehicles, battery supply-chain dependencies and the cost of technological adaptation. France and its European partners are therefore confronting a difficult industrial question: how do they maintain high wages, environmental standards and social protections while remaining competitive in markets where production costs, technology and industrial policy differ substantially?
This is not a question that can be answered through political slogans.
A country must produce things the world wants to buy, develop the technologies required to compete and maintain the skills and infrastructure necessary to support those industries.
You cannot indefinitely finance a high-cost economy by assuming that someone else will manufacture everything it consumes.
THE PUBLIC DEBT PROBLEM: YESTERDAY’S COMMITMENTS MEET TOMORROW’S OBLIGATIONS
France also faces substantial fiscal pressure. The OECD reported that public debt reached approximately 115.5% of GDP in 2025, while the budget deficit remained above 5% of GDP. The International Monetary Fund’s July 2026 assessment projected debt continuing to rise and identified modest growth, high fiscal deficits and increasing expenditure pressures as important challenges.
These figures require context. France is a large, advanced economy with significant tax-raising capacity, developed financial markets and access to the euro-area financial system. A high debt ratio does not mean that the country is unable to meet its obligations. But persistent deficits and rising debt can restrict the choices available to future governments.
A government must finance pensions, healthcare, education, infrastructure, defence, public administration and debt servicing. When the cost of borrowing increases, a larger share of public revenue may be required to meet existing financial commitments. That money competes with other priorities.
The government then faces difficult choices: increase taxation, reduce expenditure, reform public services, borrow more, improve productivity or reallocate existing resources. Each option has economic and political consequences. This is one of the central misunderstandings in modern political discourse. Governments are sometimes treated as though they possess an unlimited account from which every social problem can be resolved through sufficient political pressure. In reality, public expenditure competes with other obligations, and the state must maintain the productive economy that generates the revenue needed to finance it.
Citizens are entitled to demand better services. But the discussion must also address how those services will be financed, how efficiently the money is spent and whether the institutions delivering them are achieving measurable results. There is a difference between demanding greater public expenditure and demonstrating how that expenditure can be sustained.
DEMOGRAPHICS AND THE INTERGENERATIONAL CONTRACT
France’s ageing population adds another layer of pressure. An ageing population changes the economics of a welfare state. Pension systems, healthcare and long-term care face growing demands as the proportion of older people increases relative to the working-age population. This creates an intergenerational question: who finances the commitments made to previous generations, and how much can the state promise future generations without placing an unsustainable burden on them?
France’s 2023 pension reform, which raised the statutory retirement age from 62 to 64 on a phased basis, became a major source of public opposition. The debate illustrated how difficult it can be to reconcile demographic and fiscal pressures with public expectations and established social protections. The issue is not whether social protections are inherently unaffordable. They are an important part of the French social model. The issue is whether the systems financing those protections can adapt as the population, workforce and economic base change.
A government cannot treat demographic reality as a matter of political preference. The same question applies to other countries. Governments that promise benefits without examining the future composition of their workforce, the productivity of their economies and the cost of long-term obligations risk passing financial pressure from one generation to another.
ENERGY SECURITY: NUCLEAR STRENGTH DOES NOT MEAN ENERGY INDEPENDENCE
France has an important advantage over several European economies: its extensive nuclear electricity-generation system. Nuclear power provides a substantial share of French electricity and reduces the country’s exposure to some of the natural-gas price pressures experienced by other European states. But it does not eliminate international dependencies.
France still requires uranium, fuel-processing capabilities, industrial components, engineering expertise, maintenance and international supply chains. Its wider energy system also relies on imported oil and natural gas.
The war in Ukraine transformed Europe’s energy calculations, forcing countries to reconsider their dependence on Russian pipeline gas. Subsequent geopolitical instability and conflict in the Middle East have reinforced the exposure of energy markets to events beyond European borders. Energy prices influence manufacturing, transportation, agriculture, household consumption and public expenditure. A conflict thousands of kilometres away can affect the price of fuel, the cost of food production, the competitiveness of factories and the inflation experienced by households.
Energy security is therefore not simply about generating electricity. It is about the resilience of the entire energy and industrial system. This is a lesson that countries with natural resources should understand particularly well. Having a resource within one’s borders does not guarantee control over the technology, financing, processing, transportation or distribution required to turn it into economic value.
AGRICULTURE AND THE PRESSURE ON RURAL FRANCE
The pressure on France is not confined to its cities, industrial centres or universities. Its agricultural sector has also experienced significant dissatisfaction. French farmers have protested over production costs, low profitability, administrative burdens, environmental regulations and competition from imports. Concerns about the proposed European Union-Mercosur trade agreement have also highlighted the conflict between expanding international trade and protecting domestic agricultural producers.
Consumers want affordable food. Farmers need prices that cover production costs. Governments want to meet environmental objectives. Trade agreements create opportunities for exporters while exposing domestic producers to international competition.
Those objectives do not always align. This reveals another important feature of the French situation: it is not one unified movement with one unified grievance. Students, workers, farmers, small-business owners, public-sector employees and industrial communities may all be dissatisfied, but their interests and preferred solutions are not necessarily the same.
A government attempting to respond to all these pressures must reconcile competing demands while operating within fiscal and institutional constraints. That is a difficult exercise in governance, not merely a communications problem.
THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION: FRANCE IS NOT OPERATING ALONE
France’s economic position must also be understood within the European Union and the eurozone. The country benefits from access to the single market, a common currency, integrated supply chains and a large regional trading bloc. But it also faces competition from other European economies and operates within shared monetary and regulatory arrangements.
The European Central Bank sets monetary policy for the euro area rather than for France alone. European fiscal rules, competition policy and common trade arrangements also shape the choices available to French governments. The continent has faced several overlapping challenges: energy-market disruption following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, higher defence requirements, competition from Chinese industrial producers, dependence on external suppliers for critical technologies and materials, uncertainty over transatlantic trade and security relationships, and the cost of financing the green transition.
France’s position is therefore connected to the wider European economic environment.
Its ability to maintain diplomatic, military and economic influence depends partly on its ability to remain economically competitive and fiscally credible. A country can retain considerable international influence while facing constraints on its domestic economic capacity. This is an important distinction when assessing national power. Political influence, military capability, industrial competitiveness and fiscal strength are related, but they are not interchangeable.
POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION AND THE CRISIS OF INSTITUTIONAL CONFIDENCE
The economic pressures become more difficult to manage when political institutions struggle to produce durable agreements. France has experienced considerable parliamentary fragmentation and uncertainty following the 2024 legislative election. Changes in government and disagreements over fiscal policy have complicated the process of building consensus around economic reform.
The IMF’s July 2026 assessment identified domestic policy uncertainty and the upcoming electoral cycle as risks to confidence and investment. The OECD has also emphasized the importance of a credible, multi-year fiscal strategy and more effective public spending.
Businesses need predictability. Investors need confidence in the policy environment. Public institutions need stable priorities. Citizens need to understand what the government intends to do and whether it can deliver.
When political uncertainty becomes persistent, its effects can extend beyond parliamentary debate. It can influence investment decisions, employment, consumer confidence and the willingness of businesses to expand. There is also a broader question about the relationship between political representation and public expectations. Elections determine who receives authority to govern, but they do not automatically resolve disagreements over how a country should allocate resources, distribute economic opportunity or respond to international change. The political system must still negotiate those differences.
WHEN UNREST CHANGES THE POLITICAL CONVERSATION
The 60 Minutes report also examines the political opportunities created by unrest, including the growing visibility of Marine Le Pen and the National Rally. This is an important dimension because political instability does not benefit only the people who initiate demonstrations. Other political actors can use the resulting public anxiety to advance different agendas.
A movement may begin with demands for better schools and fairer economic opportunities, only to become part of a national debate dominated by immigration, policing, national identity and public order. That does not mean every protester is responsible for the rise of an opposing political movement. Nor does it mean that the concerns raised by demonstrators are illegitimate. It means that the political consequences of unrest are not necessarily controlled by the people who initiate it.
When public confidence in existing institutions declines, political challengers can present themselves as alternatives. The more disorder becomes associated with the established political leadership, the more space there may be for competing interpretations of what the country needs. The street can create political pressure. It cannot guarantee who will inherit the political advantage. This is why movements need to understand the political environment in which they operate, including the possibility that their actions may strengthen interests and agendas different from their original objectives.
BELIZE AND THE MEMORY OF DESTRUCTION
This discussion is not confined to France. I remember the demonstrations, disorder and incidents of destruction that Belize experienced around the 2008 political period. Those events offer their own lessons about the relationship between political emotion, public order and the consequences of unrest. Belize is a much smaller economy than France. The scale of its public resources, private capital markets, insurance sector and capacity to rebuild is different. In a smaller economy, the destruction of a business, public facility or piece of infrastructure can have a disproportionate effect on the community around it.
There may be fewer alternative employers, fewer sources of credit and fewer institutions with the financial capacity to absorb unexpected losses. A damaged business may not have the capital to reopen. A public facility may remain unrepaired for years. A road or community asset may be essential to economic activity, and its loss can affect people who were never involved in the demonstration.
There is also a historical dimension. Buildings, records, monuments and public institutions are not always replaceable in the way a political slogan might suggest. When historic property is destroyed, the loss can extend beyond the immediate financial cost. It can erase architectural character, community memory and tangible evidence of a country’s past.
A society should be capable of challenging its institutions without casually destroying the physical record of its own history.
There is no need to romanticize the past or excuse government failures. Peaceful protest, organized labour, investigative journalism, litigation and electoral participation are essential instruments of democratic accountability. There are circumstances in which public pressure becomes unavoidable because institutions have resisted reform for too long. But the legitimacy of a grievance does not automatically legitimize every action taken in its name.
GOVERNANCE NEEDS A FIRMWARE UPDATE
In an earlier HYDESMAN POST discussion, we argued that governance needs a firmware update. That metaphor remains relevant because many of the institutions through which modern societies are governed were designed for a different technological, economic and demographic environment.
Young populations communicate instantly, organize across borders, compare their living conditions with those of people in other countries and encounter information at a scale previous generations could not have imagined. They can see the wealth generated by global markets while simultaneously experiencing the limitations of their local economies. They can observe the lifestyles of billionaires while struggling with housing, education, employment and the cost of basic necessities. The institutions responsible for translating public expectations into policy often operate through slow administrative processes, outdated systems, fragmented responsibilities and political incentives that reward short-term survival over long-term reform.
That creates a widening gap between the speed at which dissatisfaction develops and the speed at which governments respond. Updating governance does not mean abandoning constitutional order, professional administration or the rule of law. It means improving how institutions listen, allocate resources, publish information, measure performance, procure services and deliver outcomes. It means making public systems more transparent, more responsive and more capable of explaining not only what they intend to do, but whether they have actually done it.
Governments should not have to wait for a building to burn before recognizing that a school is deteriorating. A functional public administration should identify failing infrastructure, unfilled teaching positions, inadequate sanitation and resource shortages through routine monitoring, transparent reporting and enforceable accountability. Likewise, young people should not have to rely exclusively on street demonstrations to make their concerns visible. There should be credible channels through which students, workers, entrepreneurs and communities can influence decisions before frustration reaches a breaking point.
A modern state should be capable of detecting institutional failure before that failure becomes a national crisis.
THE WARNING FOR COUNTRIES THAT HAVE NOT YET FACED THIS CONVERGENCE
France’s experience should not be treated as an isolated European problem. It provides a framework for examining vulnerabilities in countries of different sizes, political systems and stages of development. For smaller economies and former colonies in particular, several lessons deserve attention.
First, political independence is not the same as economic independence.
A country can possess sovereignty while remaining heavily dependent on external capital, imported fuel, foreign technology, international credit and overseas markets. Political independence is an essential achievement. Economic resilience requires more.
Second, public commitments must be supported by a productive economy.
Education, healthcare, social protection and infrastructure require sustainable revenue. Borrowing can finance investment and help governments manage temporary shocks, but it cannot permanently substitute for productivity. The question is not simply how much a government spends. It is whether the economy generates enough value to sustain the commitments being made.
Third, international partnerships should not become permanent vulnerabilities. France’s changing relationships in Africa demonstrate that geopolitical arrangements can evolve. Countries should diversify commercial relationships, protect their negotiating position and avoid allowing one external partner to become indispensable.
Fourth, natural resources are not wealth until they are converted into value.
Possessing uranium, oil, timber, minerals, agricultural land or other resources does not guarantee prosperity. The value chain matters: extraction, processing, manufacturing, logistics, financing, taxation, intellectual property and distribution. Countries that export raw materials while importing finished products can remain structurally dependent despite possessing valuable resources.
Fifth, protect the small-business economy.
Businesses provide employment, tax revenue, local investment and economic continuity. Their destruction can make already disadvantaged communities more vulnerable. Political criticism should distinguish between the institutions and interests being challenged and the ordinary people whose livelihoods depend on the local economy.
Sixth, modernize institutions before public frustration becomes a crisis.
Governments need mechanisms for identifying problems, publishing evidence, responding to complaints and measuring performance. A modern state should not require a national confrontation before it recognizes that a school, hospital, road or public service is failing.
Seventh, teach young people how economies and institutions actually work.
Political literacy should extend beyond elections. Young people should understand budgets, taxes, banking, insurance, trade, energy, contracts, property rights, procurement, public administration and international relations. They should understand how decisions are made, who has authority, where money comes from and how institutions can be held accountable.
That knowledge gives citizens more ways to exercise influence than simply waiting for another election or taking to the streets.
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RESISTANCE AND RECONSTRUCTION
There is a fundamental difference between confronting power and destroying the resources a community needs. There is a difference between holding a government accountable and making the recovery of public infrastructure more expensive. There is a difference between challenging an economic system and damaging the livelihoods of people who have little influence over that system.
A serious political movement should be able to answer a simple question: after the demonstration, what is the plan? Who will rebuild the school? Where will the funding come from? How will affected businesses recover? What changes to legislation are being demanded? Which institutions must implement them? How will performance be measured? What happens if the government refuses to act? And how will the movement ensure that the political outcome does not simply replace one set of unaccountable interests with another?
These are not questions designed to discourage activism. They are questions that distinguish a movement capable of changing a country from one capable only of disrupting it.
The ability to mobilize people is a form of power. The ability to organize, negotiate, legislate, finance, build and govern is another. The latter determines whether a society is actually transformed. Young people should demand more from their governments, but they should also demand more from their own political education. Understand how the national budget works. Understand the banking system, insurance, international trade, energy security, industrial policy and the legal structures that govern ownership and public accountability.
Understand how capital moves, how institutions acquire power and how that power can be challenged without destroying the foundations required for progress. The objective should not be to preserve every existing arrangement. Some arrangements deserve to be dismantled and replaced. But replacement requires a credible alternative, and a credible alternative requires people who understand what they are attempting to build.
THE FUTURE CANNOT BE BUILT FROM THE ASHES ALONE
France is confronting the consequences of a changing international environment and the pressures within its own economic and political model. Its historical relationships are evolving. Its industrial competitiveness is under pressure. Its public finances face difficult choices. Its population is ageing. Its energy and supply chains remain exposed to international developments. Its political institutions must negotiate increasingly fragmented expectations.
None of these factors alone explains the unrest. Together, they provide a much more complete picture of the environment in which the unrest has developed. The danger for other countries is assuming that these pressures are uniquely French or that they can be avoided simply because an economy is smaller, a population is younger or a government has not yet experienced widespread demonstrations. Smaller countries can face similar structural vulnerabilities, sometimes with fewer resources available to manage them. Dependence on foreign capital, imported energy, external markets and a narrow productive base can create economic exposure long before that exposure becomes visible in the streets.
The answer cannot be to pretend that grievances do not exist. Nor can it be to celebrate destruction as though it were an economic redistribution mechanism. Burning a business does not build a new one. Looting a shop does not create employment. Destroying a school does not improve education. Damaging a public institution does not automatically make it more accountable. The financial burden does not fall exclusively on the people who own the most property. It reaches employees, suppliers, customers, taxpayers, municipalities and future generations who inherit the cost of rebuilding.
A generation should be able to challenge inadequate systems without being encouraged to destroy the resources required to create better ones. It should understand not only what is wrong, but how the machinery of government, finance, trade and international relations actually works. The real measure of a political movement is not how much it can bring a country to a standstill. It is whether it can help build a country that works when the streets are quiet again.
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